This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks-that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.
Introduction
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 originated in massive bank losses on US mortgage loans. It spread rapidly to the Euro Area (EA) and other parts of the world, and led to the worst global recession since the Great Depression. These events were countered by sizable fiscal stimulus measures (increased government purchases of goods and services, transfers to households, and tax cuts) and massive government support for banks (e.g., purchases of 'toxic' assets and bank recapitalizations by the state). This paper evaluates the efficacy of these measures, using a New Keynesian model with a bank. We estimate the model with EA data (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) , using Bayesian methods.
The key novelty of the study is the quantitative analysis of fiscal policy, in an economy in which the health of the banking system is a key determinant of interest rates and real activity. We assume a rich fiscal policy setup, with distorting taxes, government consumption and investment, and transfers to households and the banking system. A representative bank receives deposits from savers (patient households), and makes loans to impatient households who use their house as collateral. The bank also invests in domestic government bonds, and in foreign bonds. Importantly, the bank faces a capital requirement:
she has to finance a fraction of her assets using her own funds (equity). This requirement reflects legal requirements and market pressures. In this structure, bank capital is an important state variable. A loan default lowers bank capital, which raises the spread between the mortgage lending rate and the deposit rate, and leads to a fall in investment, employment and output. Government support to the bank, modeled here as a public transfer to the bank financed by higher taxes, boosts bank capital, lowers spreads, and raises investment and output. Investment drops sharply in financial crises. Thus, government support for banking stabilizes a component of aggregate demand that is especially adversely affected by financial crises. By contrast, higher government consumption crowds out consumption and investment.
We use the estimated model to quantify the main drivers of recent business cycle fluctuations in the EA economy. Bank losses explain about a quarter of the fall in EA GDP and consumption in 2007-09, and more than three-quarters of the fall in private nonresidential investment. Our empirical results suggest that government support for banks noticeably dampened the fall in EA GDP, consumption and investment during the crisis.
Increased government purchases likewise helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the 20 percentage point rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the 3 onset of the crisis. Our model also suggests that a default on sovereign debt held by the banking system would disrupt real activity. By contrast, a default on sovereign debt held by households is predicted to have a negligible effect on real activity.
Earlier assessments of fiscal stimulus in the crisis were based on models without banks--see, e.g., Coenen et al. (2012) , Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) , Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) and Forni and Pisani (2011) . Those studies concentrated on the effects of temporary fiscal impulses in the form of increased government purchases of goods and services, transfers to households, and tax cuts. By contrast, the macro-economic effects of the government measures to support banks have, so far, received little attention in the literature.
Our paper seeks to fill this gap. The paper also contributes to the literature, by estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a rich fiscal policy set-upwhereas the related macro literature has traditionally relied on calibrated models.
1
Before the financial crisis, standard macro theory largely abstracted from financial intermediaries. The crisis has stimulated much research that incorporates banks into DSGE models. See, for example, Gerali et al. (2010) , Curdia and Woodford (2010) , in't Veld et al.
(2011), Meh and Moran (2010) and Kollmann et al. (2011) . These papers use calibrated models, abstract from fiscal policy, and do not analyze government bank support measures.
2
A further contribution of the paper here is that it develops a novel specification of the banking sector. Previous DSGE models assume that banks only accumulate capital through retained earnings, and that banks take deposits from households and lend to the non-financial business sector. Yet, in reality, banks can issue equity to raise capital; also, lending to households is a key activity of banks--in the EA, bank loans to households exceed loans to non-financial firms. Our model thus assumes a bank that is owned by an entrepreneur who also owns the production sector--the entrepreneur can use his non-bank wealth to raise the bank's capital. Also, the bank lends to households. 3 We show that, although the bank can issue equity, loan default shocks have a persistent negative effect on real activity.
1 Ratto et al. (2009 ), Forni et al. (2009 , Leeper et al. (2010) , Leeper et al. (2011) , Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) and Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) likewise estimate DSGE models with fiscal policy. 2 Gerali et al. (2010) also estimate a DSGE model with a banking sector. Roeger and in't Veld (2012) study the effect of government support for banks, in stylized RBC models. So do Sandri and Valencia (2012) , Bianchi (2012) and Haavio et al. (2012) who focus on normative issues (we learnt about these papers after the research here was completed). 3 Setups with patient savers and impatient collateral-constrained borrowers have also been considered by Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) , but those authors assumed direct lending (no bank) between these classes of households.
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Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the numerical solution and the econometric approach. Section 4 discusses properties of the estimated model. Section 5 concludes.
The economy
We consider an open economy with a representative entrepreneur, two workers and a government. The entrepreneur owns a bank, an intermediate good producing firm, and a distribution firm. The two workers provide labor services to the intermediate good producing firm, and accumulate housing capital. The workers have different rates of time preference. In equilibrium, the more patient worker holds financial assets (bank deposits and government debt). The other (impatient) worker borrows from the bank, using her housing capital as collateral. The bank thus acts as an intermediary between the patient worker and the impatient worker. The bank also holds bonds issued by the domestic government and by the rest of the word. Importantly, the bank faces a capital constraint-a fraction of her assets has to be financed using bank capital. The distribution firm sells the intermediate output to firms that aggregate locally produced and imported intermediates into a homogeneous final good.
The final good is used for private and public consumption and investment, and exported. The distribution firm has market power. Wages are set by a monopolistic labor union. Nominal prices charged by the distribution firm and nominal wages are sticky. All other markets are competitive. The government levies distorting taxes, and issues debt; a monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate on government debt. We next present the key aspects of agents' decision problems. 
Patient and impatient workers
Workers' welfare depends on final good consumption, hours worked and on their stock of housing capital. There is habit formation for each of these choice variables. Worker s=i,p  By contrast, the utility weights of housing and labor ( , ) ss  differ across workers-those weights are set to target the steady state consumption shares of the two workers, and the ratio of residential investment to GDP. 6 As sovereign default is modeled in a lump-sum fashion (see below), the patient worker is indifferent between holding deposits and government bonds; thus the interest rates on these assets are equalized. Each of these three business entities maximizes the present values of profits, discounting future profits using the entrepreneur's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
The intermediate good producing firm
The firm has the technology 1 ( ) , The distributor acts as a monopolist, and sets prices for each variety subject to Calvo (1983) price adjustment schemes. This implies that the (log) inflation rate of the domestically produced composite
obeys an expectational Phillips curve, up to a (log-) linear approximation (e.g., Erceg et al. (2000)): 
The bank
The paper assumes a representative bank. 12 In addition to her deposit and loan activities, the bank invests in one-period government bonds and in an internationally traded bond denominated in foreign currency. The bank's holdings of government and foreign bonds at the end of period t are denoted by 
where t  is any other random variable. The entrepreneur's Euler equation for non-residential capital is then given by (1). 11 ( 1)/   is the inverse of the steady state mark-up factor charged by the distribution firm.9 reflects legal requirement and market pressures. 13 The bank can deviate from the required capital ratio, but this is costly. Let 14 At date t, the bank also bears a real operating cost
In period t, the impatient household and the foreign bond issuer default by exogenous real amounts 0 L t  and 0
F t
 on the sums owed to the bank ( , ). When a loan loss occurs, the government may provide financial assistance to the bank, in the form of a subsidy B t S (E.g., when the bank faces loan default, the government may purchase maturing loans from the bank, at face value--B t S then is the difference between the face value and the fair value of the loans.)
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However, the government itself may become a threat to the bank's health, by defaulting on its debt. Let 
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The bank's period t budget constraint is, hence:
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d is the bank's dividend, and F t R is the gross interest rate on the foreign bond. The bank's Euler equations for deposits and mortgage loans are:
(Log-)Linear approximations of (1) and (2) imply that the spread between the expected real returns on private non-residential investment and deposits obeys:
with 11 ln( / ).
To get an intuition for this expression, assume that the bank increases deposits by an amount corresponding to one unit of the final good, in order to increase the dividend, and that the entrepreneur uses the higher dividend to increase the production firm's capital stock. This raises the bank's operating cost by ,  and it lowers the bank's capital by one unit, which increases the bank's cost Linear approximations of (2)- (3) show that the spread between the bank loan rate and the deposit rate obeys:
If the bank raises deposits and loans by one unit of the final good, then her operating cost increases by 2 ; excess bank capital falls by ,  which increases the penalty spread' is more sensitive than the lending rate spread to changes in the bank capital ratio.
Wage setting
We assume a trade union that 'differentiates' homogenous labor hours provided by the two workers into imperfectly substitutable labor services, and then offers these services to the intermediate good-producing firm--the labor input t N in the producer's production function (see above) is a CES aggregate of these differentiated labor services. The union sets nominal wage rates of the differentiated labor services to maximize the sum of the expected life-time utilities of the two workers, subject to independent Calvo (1983) wage adjustment schemes for each type of differentiated labor (Kollmann (2001 (Kollmann ( , 2002 z is the gap between a weighted average of workers' marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure, and the real wage rate.
Final good sector
The final good technology is Real Government consumption, investment and transfers to workers track the total technology trend , t Z and respond to deviations of the public debt and deficit from long run targets for these variables, according to these policy rules:
where /, 
T T T T
   is the total real tax revenue, net of transfers to workers.
Model solution and econometric approach
The model is transformed into a stationary system, by normalizing real activity, aggregate demand components and assets using the 'total' technology trend t Z . We compute an approximate model solution by linearizing the transformed economy around its deterministic steady state. 19 The share of worker s=i,p in the total transfer equals the steady state share of the worker's consumption in total consumption of the two workers. 20 We also experimented with a feedback rule under which the transfer to the bank is set as a function of bank losses, sovereign debt, the deficit and output. However, our dataset only includes 4 quarters with bank support (bank support was concentrated in 2009), and thus it is impossible to reliably estimate such a decision rule (the estimated response coefficients are insignificant); model fit (as measured by the marginal likelihood) deteriorates when the feedback rule is assumed. (2010), we set the discount factor of the impatient household at the markedly lower value of 0.960, in order to ensure that the collateral constraint always binds in the stochastic equilibrium. The subjective discount factor of the entrepreneur is set at 0.974, which allows the model to match the empirical mean ratio of private non-residential capital to annual GDP of 1.05. 21 (The ratio of total capital to GDP is 2.5).
Calibrated parameters
The steady state ratio of bank loans to annual GDP is set at 45% (which corresponds to the mean ratio of outstanding household loans to GDP in the EA We treat loan losses as exogenous. As pointed out by a referee, it would be interesting to allow for endogeneity of losses with respect to aggregate activity. However, the short sample on EA loan losses makes it impossible to reliably estimate such an endogenous effect. Also, about half of the losses experienced by EA banks were due to external assets (largely located in the US), as mentioned above. Hence, a substantial part of EA bank losses was not caused by a worsening of macroeconomic conditions in the EA.
The empirical literature on credit-constrained household frequently reports that the income share of these households is in the range of 25% or above. 23 We set the steady state income share of credit-constrained households at 25%, and assume that, in steady state, the entrepreneur holds 50% of total net worth.
24
The steady state ratios of government debt and of household mortgage debt to annual GDP are set at 0.7 and 0.46, respectively (which corresponds to sample means of these ratios). In steady state, 23% of government debt is held by the bank. Tax rates are likewise calibrated on sample averages (the tax rates on consumption, labor income and dividends are set at 0.20, 0.30 and 0.27, respectively). Government transfers to households amount to 17%
of GDP, and 23% of sovereign debt is held by the bank, in steady state.
Estimated parameters
The remaining parameters are estimated using a Bayesian approach (Otrok (2001) , Smets and Wouters (2007)), with quarterly EA data for 1995q1-2011q4. 25 We assume that all exogenous variables are normally (or log-normally) distributed, and independent from each other. The estimation uses data on EA GDP and its components, the deflators of these aggregates, the interest rate on mortgage loans to households, the short-term government bond rate, bank asset write-downs, government support for banks, the bank capital ratio, government consumption, investment and transfers to households, public debt, and the nominal exchange rate. In addition, data on GDP and the short term interest in the rest of the world are used.
Note that the estimation uses historical data on the fiscal variables, on government bank support and on loan losses. 26 The empirical measure of bank support is the sum of bank recapitalizations and of purchases of impaired bank assets by EA governments. 27 See the Appendix for further information on the data.
Posterior estimates of key structural parameters are reported in Table 1 . We set the prior mean duration between price and wage changes at 2 quarters; according to the posterior estimates, the mean durations between price and wage changes are 7 quarters and 4 quarters, 17 respectively. The posterior estimate of the long-run Frisch labor supply elasticity 1/  is 0.22.
The estimates also suggest strong habit formation for consumption, housing and hours worked. The curvature parameter of the bank's cost of deviating from the target bank capital ratio is estimated at 0.65,
implying that a 1 percentage point rise in the bank capital ratio lowers the spread between the mortgage loan rate and the deposit rate by 40 basis points p.a., which is in line with empirical estimates of the response of the loan rate spread reported by Kollmann (2012) . We also find a stronger feedback from debt/GDP and deficit/GDP ratios to government investment than to government consumption and to government transfers to households. 
The role of bank losses and fiscal policy in the Great Recession

Impulse responses
The estimated model predicts that a loan loss shock generates a sizable reduction in real activity, while government support for banks has a substantial positive effect on output and consumption and, especially, on private investment. A rise in government consumption also raises output, but crowds out consumption and (especially) investment, in the short run. 
Government support for banking (Figure 1, Panel (b))
Qualitatively, the effects of government support for the bank are mirror-images of the responses to the loan loss shock. The bank reacts to the government subsidy by increasing her capital, and by paying a higher dividend. The entrepreneur responds to this by raising physical investment in the intermediate good-producing firm. Thus, government support for banks stabilizes a component of aggregate demand that was especially adversely affected by the crisis. The increase in bank capital is persistent, and it thus leads to a persistent reduction in the lending rate spread, and in the non-residential investment spread. Thus, mortgage lending increases. However, the entrepreneur allocates the additional funds received by the government mostly to non-residential investment and less to mortgage lending. This is a consequence of the fact that the bank rescue measure is a wealth transfer from workers to the entrepreneur (mortgage loans increase only slightly, as borrowers expect to pay higher future taxes). In the first quarter, the bank subsidy raises GDP and non-residential investment by 0.13% and 0.7%, respectively. The effect of the bank rescue measure is persistent: during the first (second) year, GDP rises by 0.11% (0.04%), while non-residential investment increases by 0.53% (0.26%) over the same horizon. 28 The cumulative GDP multiplier (ratio of cumulated GDP changes to cumulated fiscal spending changes) of the bank rescue measure is 0.44 during the first year (but is greater at longer horizons).
Government purchases (Figure 1, Panel (c))
The estimated law of motion of government consumption is highly persistent--an innovation to the law of motion of government consumption worth 1% of steady state quarterly GDP raises government consumption by 1.26% (1.21%) of GDP in year 1 (year 2). The cumulative increase in government consumption amounts to 5.10% of annual GDP. GDP rises by 0.81% (0.64%) of GDP in year 1 (year 2), and employment too increase persistently. Consumption and investment fall by 0.05% and 1.19%, respectively in year 1. Private consumption remains depressed thereafter, while investment returns to its pre-shock value in year 2, and then rises above the unshocked paths in years 3-5 (due to the rise in employment which increases the marginal product of capital). 29 The GDP multiplier is 0.64 in year 1, a value in the lower range of multipliers predicted by estimated New Keynesian models without banks--see, e.g., the models discussed in Coenen et al. (2012) . 30 A comparison with Panel (b) shows that government consumption has a larger impact multiplier than government support for banking, but that government consumption crowds out consumption and investment (in the short term), while bank support raises consumption and investment. shows responses to a one-time bank support; by contrast, loan losses are serially correlated and thus a given loss innovation triggers a much greater cumulated loss. 29 Private consumption rises slightly in the first two quarters, because the consumption of credit constrained households responds positively to the increase in their labor income. Consumption falls thereafter, as the rise in public debt triggers a reduction in government transfers to households. 30 Coenen et al. consider a fiscal spending shock that only lasts 2 years. With more persistent spending shock (as in the paper here), anticipated higher future (net) tax payments lead to a stronger and more rapid fall in private consumption and, thus a weaker expansion of GDP. 
Bank losses, bank rescue measures and innovations to conventional fiscal instruments
Estimates unaffected by shocks to the bank's capital (up to a first-order approximation). 32 A key difference between the sovereign loss and the loan loss (as discussed above), is that 50% of the latter is an external loss. By contrast, the sovereign loss shock is a wealth transfer within the EA economy; that redistributive nature of the shock dampens the negative aggregate consumption response. Bank support accounts for about 18% of that rise in the debt/GDP ratio, while fiscal shocks explain 33% of the increase. Together, the fiscal and bank-related shocks account for about half of the rise in the debt/GDP ratio.
Historical decompositions of real activity and public debt
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the impact of Euro Area (EA) bank asset losses, government support for banks, and conventional fiscal stimulus measures, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. Our model traces out a transmission channel of these shocks to the EA real economy which is consistent with key features of the recent financial crisis, in particular with the strong decline of non-residential investment. Bank losses explain about a quarter of the fall in EA GDP and consumption in [2007] [2008] [2009] , and more than three quarter of the fall in private non-residential investment. Government support for banks was an effective tool for stabilizing output and consumption and, especially, physical investment, the component of aggregate demand most adversely affected by the financial crisis. The sizable increase in government purchases during the crisis helped to stabilize GDP, but crowded out consumption and investment. Higher transfers to households raised private consumption, but hardly affected GDP and investment.
well as risks on collateral demanded and expectations regarding economic conditions, are reported by a significant fraction of banks as having contributed to that tightening.
DATA APPENDIX A1. The following variables are used as observables Euro Area variables:
• GDP, private consumption, government consumption, private non-residential investment, residential investment, government investment, net exports, employment. The estimation uses there variables at constant prices, plus corresponding deflators (where appropriate). As empirical measures of investment efficiency shocks, we use the ratios of private nonresidential investment deflators, of private residential investment deflators, and of government investment, to the CPI.
• Residential property prices (new and existing dwellings)
• Bank capital to asset ratio; mortgage loans to households; bank write-downs (see below); government support for banks (see below).
• Short term government bond rate; household mortgage interest rate (available since 2003 only).
• Nominal government transfers to households (Paredes et al. (2009) 
A2. Estimates of bank asset losses and of government support for banks in the EA
To construct an estimate of EA bank losses, we compute the sum of the write-downs of the 36 largest EA banks, as reported by Bloomberg (see Roeger and in't Veld (2012) ). That data is available for the period 2007q3-2010q4. These 36 banks account for 80% of total EA bank assets. We multiplied aggregate write-downs for these banks by a factor 1/0.8 to construct an estimate of total EA bank write-downs, and we added EA government purchases of impaired bank assets to the scaled series (see below). The estimation uses the resulting 2007q3-2010q4 series, as an empirical measure of EA bank loan losses. We treat loan losses in 2011 as a latent variable. The loan losses (with model implied estimates for 2011) are shown in Figure 4 . Government support for banks during the financial crisis were concentrated in the year 2009 (Laeven and Valencia (2011) ). Data on government support for banks in 2009 are reported in Table 3 . (Source: European Commission services, based on surveys of euro area member states.) The bank support measures included recapitalizations ('capital injections into financial institutions') and purchases of impaired ('toxic') assets by governments ('impaired asset relief mechanisms'). The estimation uses the sum of recapitalizations and purchases of impaired assets by EA governments (in 2009) as an empirical measure of the theoretical bank rescue measure. Bank losses are assumed to equal zero, in the rest of the sample period. 
